The Taxing and Spending Clause
McCray v. United States (1904)
195 U.S. 27 (1904)
Majority: White, joined by Harlan, Brewer, White, McKenna, Holmes and Day
Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Brown, Peckham
The judiciary is without authority to avoid an act of Congress lawfully exerting the taxing power, even in a case where, to the judicial mind, it seems that Congress had, in putting such power in motion, abused its lawful authority by levying a tax which was unwise or oppressive, or the result of the enforcement of which might be to indirectly affect subjects not within the powers delegated to Congress; nor can the judiciary inquire into the motive or purpose of Congress in adopting a statute levying an excise tax within its constitutional power.
While both the Fifth and Tenth Amendments qualify, insofar as they are applicable, all the provisions of the Constitution, nothing in either of them operates to take away the grant of power to tax conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, and that power being unrestrained except as limited by the Constitution, Congress may select the objects upon which the tax shall be levied, and, in exerting the power, no want of due process of law can possibly result, and the judiciary cannot usurp the functions of the legislature in order to control that branch of the Government in exercising its lawful functions.
The manufacture of artificially colored oleomargarine may be prohibited by a free government without a violation of fundamental rights.
There is such a distinction between natural butter artificially colored and oleomargarine artificially colored so as to cause it to look like butter that the taxing of the latter and not the former cannot be avoided as an arbitrary exertion of the taxing power of Congress without any basis of classification, taxing one article and excluding another of the same class.
The Oleomargarine Act of 1886, 24 Stat. 209, as amended by the act of 1902, 32 Stat. 93, imposing a tax of one quarter of one percent on oleomargarine not artificially colored any shade of yellow so as to look like butter and ten cents a pound if so colored, levies an excise tax, and is not unconstitutional as outside of the powers of Congress or an interference with the powers reserved to the States, nor can the judiciary declare the tax void because it is too high nor because it amounts to a destruction of the business of manufacturing oleomargarine, nor because it discriminates against oleomargarine and in favor of butter …
The United States sued McCray for a statutory penalty of $50, alleging that, being a licensed retail dealer in oleomargarine, he had, in violation of the acts of Congress, knowingly purchased for resale a fifty-pound package of oleomargarine, artificially colored to look like butter, to which there were affixed internal revenue stamps at the rate of one-fourth of a cent a pound, upon which the law required stamps at the rate of ten cents per pound …
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court …
2d. Did Congress in passing the acts which are assailed, exert a power not conferred by the Constitution?
That the acts in question, on their face, impose excise taxes which Congress had the power to levy is so completely established as to require only statement …
[We] hence come, first, to ascertain how far, if at all, the motives or purposes of Congress are open to judicial inquiry in considering the power of that body to enact the laws in question. Having determined the question of our right to consider motive or purpose, we shall then approach the propositions relied on by the light of the correct rule on the subject of purpose or motive.
Whilst, as a result of our written constitution, it is axiomatic that the judicial department of the government is charged with the solemn duty of enforcing the Constitution, and therefore, in cases properly presented, of determining whether a given manifestation of authority has exceeded the power conferred by that instrument, no instance is afforded from the foundation of the government where an act which was within a power conferred was declared to be repugnant to the Constitution because it appeared to the judicial mind that the particular exertion of constitutional power was either unwise or unjust. To announce such a principle would amount to declaring that, in our constitutional system, the judiciary was not only charged with the duty of upholding the Constitution, but also with the responsibility of correcting every possible abuse arising from the exercise by the other departments of their conceded authority. So to hold would be to overthrow the entire distinction between the legislative, judicial and executive departments of the government upon which our system is founded, and would be a mere act of judicial usurpation. …
The decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted … The often quoted statement of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland that the power to tax is the power to destroy affords no support whatever to the proposition that, where there is a lawful power to impose a tax, its imposition may be treated as without the power because of the destructive effect of the exertion of the authority. And this view was clearly pointed out by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in … Gibbons v. Ogden …
It being thus demonstrated that the motive or purpose of Congress in adopting the acts in question may not be inquired into, we are brought to consider the contentions relied upon to show that the acts assailed were beyond the power of Congress, putting entirely out of view all considerations based upon purpose or motive.
- Undoubtedly, in determining whether a particular act is within a granted power, its scope and effect are to be considered. Applying this rule to the acts assailed, it is self-evident that, on their face, they levy an excise tax. That being their necessary scope and operation, it follows that the acts are within the grant of power. The argument to the contrary rests on the proposition that, although the tax be within the power, as enforcing it will destroy or restrict the manufacture of artificially colored oleomargarine, therefore the power to levy the tax did not obtain. This, however, is but to say that the question of power depends not upon the authority conferred by the Constitution, but upon what may be the consequence arising from the exercise of the lawful authority.
Since, as pointed out in all the decisions referred to, the taxing power conferred by the Constitution knows no limits except those expressly stated in that instrument, it must follow, if a tax be within the lawful power, the exertion of that power may not be judicially restrained because of the results to arise from its exercise …
- The proposition that, where a tax is imposed which is within the grant of powers, and which does not conflict with any express constitutional limitation, the courts may hold the tax to be void because it is deemed that the tax is too high, is absolutely disposed of by the opinions in the cases hitherto cited, and which expressly hold, to repeat again the language of one of the cases, (Spencer v. Merchant) that
“The judicial department cannot prescribe to the legislative department limitations upon the exercise of its acknowledged powers. The power to tax may be exercised oppressively upon persons; but the responsibility of the legislature is not to the courts, but to the people by whom its members are elected.”
- Whilst undoubtedly both the Fifth and Tenth Amendments qualify, insofar as they are applicable, all the provisions of the Constitution, nothing in those amendments operates to take away the grant of power to tax conferred by the Constitution upon Congress …
The right of Congress to tax within its delegated power being unrestrained, except as limited by the Constitution, it was within the authority conferred on Congress to select the objects upon which an excise should be laid. It therefore follows that, in exerting its power, no want of due process of law could possibly result because that body chose to impose an excise on artificially colored oleomargarine and not upon natural butter artificially colored. The judicial power may not usurp the functions of the legislative in order to control that branch of the government in the performance of its lawful duties …
- Lastly, we come to consider the argument that, even though, as a general rule, a tax of the nature of the one in question would be within the power of Congress, in this case, the tax should be held not to be within such power because of its effect. This is based on the contention that, as the tax is so large as to destroy the business of manufacturing oleomargarine artificially colored to look like butter, it thus deprives the manufacturers of that article of their freedom to engage in a lawful pursuit, and hence, irrespective of the distribution of powers made by the Constitution, the taxing laws are void because they violate those fundamental rights which it is the duty of every free government to safeguard and which, therefore, should be held to be embraced by implied though nonetheless potential guaranties, or, in any event, to be within the protection of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Let us concede, for the sake of argument only, the premise of fact upon which the proposition is based. Moreover, concede … that it would be the duty of the judiciary to hold such acts to be void upon the assumption that the Constitution, by necessary implication, forbade them.
Such concession, however, is not controlling in this case. This follows when the nature of oleomargarine, artificially colored to look like butter, is recalled … It has been conclusively settled by this court that the tendency of that article to deceive the public into buying it for butter is such that the States may, in the exertion of their police powers, without violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, absolutely prohibit the manufacture of the article. It hence results that, even although it be true that the effect of the tax in question is to repress the manufacture of artificially colored oleomargarine, it cannot be said that such repression destroys rights which no free government could destroy, and therefore no ground exists to sustain the proposition that the judiciary may invoke an implied prohibition upon the theory that to do so is essential to save such rights from destruction. And the same considerations dispose of the contention based upon the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. That provision, as we have previously said, does not withdraw or expressly limit the grant of power to tax conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. From this it follows, as we have also previously declared, that the judiciary is without authority to avoid an act of Congress exerting the taxing power, even in a case where, to the judicial mind, it seems that Congress had, in putting such power in motion, abused its lawful authority by levying a tax which was unwise or oppressive, or the result of the enforcement of which might be to indirectly affect subjects not within the powers delegated to Congress …
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922)
259 U.S. 20 (1922)
Majority: Taft, joined by McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney, McReynolds, Brandeis
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question of the constitutional validity of the Child Labor Tax Law. The plaintiff below, the Drexel Furniture Company, is engaged in the manufacture of furniture in the Western District of North Carolina. On September 20, 1921, it received a notice from Bailey, United States Collector of Internal Revenue for the District, that it had been assessed $6,312.79 for having during the taxable year 1919 employed and permitted to work in its factory a boy under fourteen years of age, thus incurring the tax of ten percent on its net profits for that year. The Company paid the tax under protest, and after rejection of its claim for a refund, brought this suit. On demurrer to an amended complaint, judgment was entered for the Company against the Collector for the full amount with interest …
The Child Labor Tax Law … is attacked on the ground that it is a regulation of the employment of child labor in the States — an exclusively state function under the Federal Constitution and within the reservations of the Tenth Amendment. It is defended on the ground that it is a mere excise tax levied by the Congress of the United States under its broad power of taxation conferred by § 8, Article I, of the Federal Constitution. We must construe the law and interpret the intent and meaning of Congress from the language of the act …
The employer’s factory is to be subject to inspection at any time not only by the taxing officers of the Treasury, the Department normally charged with the collection of taxes, but also by the Secretary of Labor and his subordinates, whose normal function is the advancement and protection of the welfare of the workers. In the light of these features of the act, a court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed to stop the employment of children within the age limits prescribed. Its prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All others can see and understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?
Out of a proper respect for the acts of a coordinate branch of the Government, this court has gone far to sustain taxing acts as such, even though there has been ground for suspecting from the weight of the tax it was intended to destroy its subject …
The difference between a tax and a penalty is sometimes difficult to define, and yet the consequences of the distinction in the required method of their collection often are important. Where the sovereign enacting the law has power to impose both tax and penalty, the difference between revenue production and mere regulation may be immaterial, but not so when one sovereign can impose a tax only, and the power of regulation rests in another. Taxes are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the legislature on proper subjects with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them and with the incidental motive of discouraging them by making their continuance onerous. They do not lose their character as taxes because of the incidental motive. But there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment. Such is the case in the law before us. Although Congress does not invalidate the contract of employment or expressly declare that the employment within the mentioned ages is illegal, it does exhibit its intent practically to achieve the latter result by adopting the criteria of wrongdoing and imposing its principal consequence on those who transgress its standard.
The case before us cannot be distinguished from that of Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) …
The congressional power over interstate commerce is, within its proper scope, just as complete and unlimited as the congressional power to tax, and the legislative motive in its exercise is just as free from judicial suspicion and inquiry. Yet when Congress threatened to stop interstate commerce in ordinary and necessary commodities, unobjectionable as subjects of transportation, and to deny the same to the people of a State in order to coerce them into compliance with Congress’ regulation of state concerns, the Court said this was not, in fact, regulation of interstate commerce, but rather that of State concerns, and was invalid. So here, the so-called tax is a penalty to coerce people of a State to act as Congress wishes them to act in respect of a matter completely the business of the state government under the Federal Constitution.
This case requires, as did the Dagenhart case, the application of the principle announced by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), in a much quoted passage:
“Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the Constitution, or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government, it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.”
But it is pressed upon us that this court has gone so far in sustaining taxing measures the effect or tendency of which was to accomplish purposes not directly within congressional power that we are bound by authority to maintain this law …
McCray v. United States (1904). That, like the Veazie Bank case , was the increase of an excise tax upon a subject properly taxable in which the taxpayers claimed that the tax had become invalid because the increase was excessive. It was a tax on oleomargarine, a substitute for butter. The tax on the white oleomargarine was one-quarter of a cent a pound, and on the yellow oleomargarine was first two cents and was then by the act in question increased to ten cents per pound. This court held that the discretion of Congress in the exercise of its constitutional powers to levy excise taxes could not be controlled or limited by the Courts because the latter might deem the incidence of the tax oppressive, or even destructive. It was the same principle as that applied in the Veazie Bank case. This was that Congress, in selecting its subjects for taxation, might impose the burden where and as it would, and that a motive disclosed in its selection to discourage sale or manufacture of an article by a higher tax than on some other did not invalidate the tax. In neither of these cases did the law objected to show on its face, as does the law before, us the detailed specifications of a regulation of a state concern and business with a heavy exaction to promote the efficacy of such regulation.
The court said that the act could not be declared invalid just because another motive than taxation, not shown on the face of the act, might have contributed to its passage. This case does not militate against the conclusion we have reached in respect of the law now before us. The court there made manifest its view that the provisions of the so-called taxing act must be naturally and reasonably adapted to the collection of the tax, and not solely to the achievement of some other purpose plainly within state power. For the reason given, we must hold the Child Labor Tax Law invalid, and the judgment of the District Court is
MR. JUSTICE CLARKE dissents.
United States v. Carlton (1994)
512 U.S. 26 (1994)
Writing for Court: Blackmun, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg
Concurrence: Scalia, joined by Thomas
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1987, Congress amended a provision of the federal estate tax statute by limiting the availability of a recently added deduction for the proceeds of sales of stock to employee stock-ownership plans (ESOP’s). Congress provided that the amendment would apply retroactively, as if incorporated in the original deduction provision, which had been adopted in October 1986. The question presented by this case is whether the retroactive application of the amendment violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Respondent Jerry W. Carlton, the executor of the will of Willametta K. Day, deceased, sought to utilize the § 2057 deduction. Day died on September 29, 1985. Her estate tax return was due December 29, 1986 (after Carlton had obtained a 6-month filing extension). On December 10, 1986, Carlton used estate funds to purchase 1.5 million shares of MCI Communications Corporation for $11,206,000, at an average price of $7.47 per share. Two days later, Carlton sold the MCI stock to the MCI ESOP for $10,575,000, at an average price of $7.05 per share. The total sale price thus was $631,000 less than the purchase price. When Carlton filed the estate tax return on December 29, 1986, he claimed a deduction under § 2057 of $5,287,000, for half the proceeds of the sale of the stock to the MCI ESOP. The deduction reduced the estate tax by $2,501,161. The parties have stipulated that Carlton engaged in the MCI stock transactions specifically to take advantage of the § 2057 deduction.
On January 5, 1987, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced that, “[p]ending the enactment of clarifying legislation,” it would treat the § 2057 deduction as available only to estates of decedents who owned the securities in question immediately before death.
The IRS disallowed the deduction claimed by Carlton under § 2057 on the ground that the MCI stock had not been owned by his decedent “immediately before death.” Carlton paid the asserted estate tax deficiency, plus interest, filed a claim for refund, and instituted a refund action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. He conceded that the estate did not qualify for the deduction under the 1987 amendment to § 2057. He argued, however, that retroactive application of the 1987 amendment to the estate’s 1986 transactions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court rejected his argument and entered summary judgment in favor of the United States.
This Court repeatedly has upheld retroactive tax legislation against a due process challenge …
The due process standard to be applied to tax statutes with retroactive effect … is the same as that generally applicable to retroactive economic legislation:
“Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches. …
“To be sure, … retroactive legislation does have to meet a burden not faced by legislation that has only future effects. … ‘The retroactive aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former’. … But that burden is met simply by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose.” [Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R.A. Gray & Co] (1984) …
There is little doubt that the 1987 amendment to § 2057 was adopted as a curative measure. As enacted in October 1986, § 2057 contained no requirement that the decedent have owned the stock in question to qualify for the ESOP proceeds deduction. As a result, any estate could claim the deduction simply by buying stock in the market and immediately reselling it to an ESOP, thereby obtaining a potentially dramatic reduction in (or even elimination of) the estate tax obligation.
It seems clear that Congress did not contemplate such broad applicability of the deduction when it originally adopted § 2057. That provision was intended to create an “incentive for stockholders to sell their companies to their employees who helped them build the company rather than liquidate, sell to outsiders or have the corporation redeem their shares on behalf of existing shareholders.” Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals: Tax Treatment of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 37 (Joint Comm. Print 1985) …
We conclude that the 1987 amendment’s retroactive application meets the requirements of due process. First, Congress’ purpose in enacting the amendment was neither illegitimate nor arbitrary. Congress acted to correct what it reasonably viewed as a mistake in the original 1986 provision that would have created a significant and unanticipated revenue loss. There is no plausible contention that Congress acted with an improper motive, as by targeting estate representatives such as Carlton after deliberately inducing them to engage in ESOP transactions. Congress, of course, might have chosen to make up the unanticipated revenue loss through general prospective taxation, but that choice would have burdened equally “innocent” taxpayers. Instead, it decided to prevent the loss by denying the deduction to those who had made purely tax-motivated stock transfers. We cannot say that its decision was unreasonable.
Second, Congress acted promptly and established only a modest period of retroactivity …
Respondent Carlton argues that the 1987 amendment violates due process because he specifically and detrimentally relied on the preamendment version of § 2057 in engaging in the MCI stock transactions in December 1986. Although Carlton’s reliance is uncontested-and the reading of the original statute on which he relied appears to have been correct-his reliance alone is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Tax legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code. Justice Stone explained in Welch v. Henry … :
“Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due process. … ”
Moreover, the detrimental reliance principle is not limited to retroactive legislation. An entirely prospective change in the law may disturb the relied-upon expectations of individuals, but such a change would not be deemed therefore to be violative of due process.
Similarly, we do not consider respondent Carlton’s lack of notice regarding the 1987 amendment to be dispositive …
In focusing exclusively on the taxpayer’s notice and reliance, the Court of Appeals held the congressional enactment to an unduly strict standard. Because we conclude that retroactive application of the 1987 amendment to § 2057 is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose, we conclude that the amendment as applied to Carlton’s 1986 transactions is consistent with the Due Process Clause.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in the judgment.
If I thought that “substantive due process” were a constitutional right rather than an oxymoron, I would think it violated by bait-and-switch taxation. Although there is not much precision in the concept” ‘harsh and oppressive,'” which is what the Court has adopted as its test of substantive due process unconstitutionality in the field of retroactive tax legislation … surely it would cover a retroactive amendment that cost a taxpayer who relied on the original statute’s clear meaning over $600,000 …
The Court attempts to minimize the amendment’s harshness by characterizing it as “a curative measure,” quoting some post-legislation legislative history (another oxymoron) to show that, despite the uncontested plain meaning of the statute, Congress never meant it to apply to stock that was not owned by the decedent at the time of death … I am not sure that whether Congress has treated a citizen oppressively should turn upon whether the oppression was, after all, only Congress’ “curing” of its own mistake. Even if it should, however, what was done to respondent here went beyond a “cure.” The retroactivity not only hit him with the tax that Congress “meant” to impose originally, but it caused his expenditures incurred in invited reliance upon the earlier law to become worthless. That could have been avoided, of course, by providing a tax credit for such expenditures. Retroactively disallowing the tax benefit that the earlier law offered, without compensating those who incurred expenses in accepting that offer, seems to me harsh and oppressive by any normal measure …
The Court also attempts to soften the impact of the amendment by noting that it involved only “a modest period of retroactivity” … But in the case of a tax-incentive provision, as opposed to a tax on a continuous activity (like the earning of income), the critical event is the taxpayer’s reliance on the incentive, and the key timing issue is whether the change occurs after the reliance; that it occurs immediately after rather than long after renders it no less harsh.
The reasoning the Court applies to uphold the statute in this case guarantees that all retroactive tax laws will henceforth be valid. To pass constitutional muster the retroactive aspects of the statute need only be “rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose.” Ante, at 35. Revenue raising is certainly a legitimate legislative purpose, see U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and any law that retroactively adds a tax, removes a deduction, or increases a rate rationally furthers that goal. I welcome this recognition that the Due Process Clause does not prevent retroactive taxes, since I believe that the Due Process Clause guarantees no substantive rights, but only (as it says) process …
I cannot avoid observing, however, two stark discrepancies between today’s due process reasoning and the due process reasoning the Court applies to its identification of new so-
called fundamental rights, such as the right to structure family living arrangements … and the right to an abortion … First and most obviously, where respondent’s claimed right to hold onto his property is at issue, the Court upholds the tax amendment because it rationally furthers a legitimate interest; whereas when other claimed rights that the Court deems fundamental are at issue, the Court strikes down laws that concededly promote legitimate interests … Secondly, when it is pointed out that the Court’s retroactive-tax ruling today is inconsistent with earlier decisions … the Court dismisses those cases as having been “decided during an era characterized by exacting review of economic legislation under an approach that ‘has long since been discarded.'” … But economic legislation was not the only legislation subjected to “exacting review” in those bad old days, and one wonders what principled reason justifies “discarding” that bad old approach only as to that category …
The picking and choosing among various rights to be accorded “substantive due process” protection is alone enough to arouse suspicion; but the categorical and inexplicable exclusion of so-called “economic rights” (even though the Due Process Clause explicitly applies to “property”) unquestionably involves policymaking rather than neutral legal analysis. I would follow the text of the Constitution, which sets forth certain substantive rights that cannot be taken away, and adds, beyond that, a right to due process when life, liberty, or property is to be taken away.