The Commerce Clause
Commerce and the States
a.k.a. the Dormant Commerce Clause
Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852)
53 U.S. 299 (1852)
Decision: Affirmed
Vote: 5-3
Majority: Curtis, joined by Taney, Catron, Nelson and Grier
Concurrence: Daniel
Dissent: McLean, joined by Wayne
Not participating: McKinley
Mr. Justice CURTIS delivered the opinion of the court.
…
[These cases] are actions to recover half pilotage fees under the 29th section of the act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, passed on the second day of March, 1803. The plaintiff in error alleges that the highest court of the state has decided against a right claimed by him under the Constitution of the United States. That right is to be exempted from the payment of the sums of money demanded, pursuant to the State law above referred to, because that law contravenes several provisions of the Constitution of the United States.
The particular section of the state law drawn in question is as follows:
“That every ship or vessel arriving from or bound to any foreign port or place … sailing from or bound to any port not within the river Delaware, shall be obliged to receive a pilot. And it shall be the duty of the master of every such ship or vessel, within thirty-six hours next after the arrival of such ship or vessel at the city of Philadelphia, to make report to the master-warden … And it shall be the duty of the wardens to enter every such vessel in a book to be by them kept for that purpose, without fee or reward. And if the master of any ship or vessel shall neglect to make such report, he shall forfeit and pay the sum of sixty dollars. And if the master of any such ship or vessel shall refuse or neglect to take a pilot, the master … shall forfeit and pay to the warden aforesaid, a sum equal to the half-pilotage of such ship or vessel, to the use of the Society for the Relief, &c., to be recovered as pilotage in the manner hereinafter directed: Provided always, that where it shall appear to the warden that, in case of an inward-bound vessel, a pilot did not offer before she had reached Reedy Island, or, in case of an outward-bound vessel, that a pilot could not be obtained for twenty-four hours after such vessel was ready to depart, the penalty aforesaid, for not having a pilot, shall not be incurred.”
It constitutes one section of “An act to establish a Board of Wardens for the port of Philadelphia, and for the regulation of Pilots and Pilotages, &c.,” and the scope of the act is in conformity with the title to regulate the whole subject of the pilotage of that port.
We think this particular regulation concerning half-pilotage fees is an appropriate part of a general system of regulations of this subject. Testing it by the practice of commercial states and countries legislating on this subject, we find it has usually been deemed necessary to make similar provisions … Like other laws, they are framed to meet the most usual cases … they rest upon the propriety of securing lives and property exposed to the perils of a dangerous navigation by taking on board a person peculiarly skilled to encounter or avoid them, upon the policy of discouraging the commanders of vessels from refusing to receive such persons on board at the proper times and places … The laws of commercial states and countries have made an offer of pilotage service one of those cases, and we cannot pronounce a law which does this to be so far removed from the usual and fit scope of laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage as to be deemed, for this cause, a covert attempt to legislate upon another subject under the appearance of legislating on this one.
It is urged that the second section of the act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, of the 11th of June, 1832, proves that the state had other objects in view than the regulation of pilotage …
It must be remembered that the fair objects of a law imposing half-pilotage when a pilot is not received may be secured and at the same time some classes of vessels exempted from such charge. Thus, the very section of the act of 1803 now under consideration does not apply to coasting vessels of less burden than seventy-five tons, not to those bound to, or sailing from, a port in the river Delaware. The purpose of the law being to cause masters of such vessels as generally need a pilot to employ one, and to secure to the pilots a fair remuneration for cruising in search of vessels or waiting for employment in port, there is an obvious propriety in having reference to the number, size, and nature of employment of vessels frequenting the port, and it will be found by an examination of the different systems of these regulations which have from time to time been made in this and other countries that the legislative discretion has been constantly exercised in making discriminations founded on differences both in the character of the trade and the tonnage of vessels engaged therein.
We do not perceive anything in the nature or extent of this particular discrimination in favor of vessels engaged in the coal trade which would enable us to declare it to be other than a fair exercise of legislative discretion …
For these reasons, we cannot yield our assent to the argument that this provision of law is in conflict with the second and third clauses of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution, which prohibit a state, without the assent of Congress, from laying any imposts or duties, on imports or exports or tonnage … and to declare that such pilot fees or penalties are embraced within the words imposts or duties on imports, exports, or tonnage would be to confound things essentially different, and which must have been known to be actually different by those who used this language. It cannot be denied that a tonnage duty or an impost on imports or exports may be levied under the name of pilot dues or penalties, and certainly it is the thing, and not the name, which is to be considered …
It remains to consider the objection that it is repugnant to the third clause of the eighth section of the first article: “The Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”
The power to regulate navigation is the power to prescribe rules in conformity with which navigation must be carried on. It extends to the persons who conduct it as well as to the instruments used. Accordingly, the first Congress assembled under the Constitution passed laws requiring the masters of ships and vessels of the United States to be citizens of the United States, and established many rules for the government and regulation of officers and seamen. 1 Stat. at L. 55, 131. These have been from time to time added to and changed, and we are not aware that their validity has been questioned.
Now a pilot, so far as respects the navigation of the vessel in that part of the voyage which is his pilotage ground, is the temporary master charged with the safety of the vessel and cargo, and of the lives of those on board, and intrusted with the command of the crew. He is not only one of the persons engaged in navigation, but he occupies a most important and responsible place among those thus engaged. And if Congress has power to regulate the seamen who assist the pilot in the management of the vessel, a power never denied, we can perceive no valid reason why the pilot should be beyond the reach of the same power. It is true that, according to the usages of modern commerce on the ocean, the pilot is on board only during a part of the voyage between ports of different states, or between ports of the United States and foreign countries, but if he is on board for such a purpose and during so much of the voyage as to be engaged in navigation, the power to regulate navigation extends to him while thus engaged as clearly as it would if he were to remain on board throughout the whole passage, from port to port. For it is a power which extends to every part of the voyage, and may regulate those who conduct or assist in conducting navigation in one part of a voyage as much as in another part, or during the whole voyage …
Nor should it be lost sight of that this subject of the regulation of pilots and pilotage has an intimate connection with, and an important relation to, the general subject of commerce with foreign nations and among the several states over which it was one main object of the Constitution to create a national control. Conflicts between the laws of neighboring states and discriminations favorable or adverse to commerce with particular foreign nations might be created by state laws regulating pilotage, deeply affecting that equality of commercial rights and that freedom from state interference which those who formed the Constitution were so anxious to secure and which the experience of more than half a century has taught us to value so highly. The apprehension of this danger is not speculative merely. For, in 1837, Congress actually interposed to relieve the commerce of the country from serious embarrassment arising from the laws of different states situate upon waters which are the boundary between them …
It becomes necessary therefore to consider whether this law of Pennsylvania, being a regulation of commerce, is valid.
The act of Congress of the 7th of August, 1789, sect. 4, is as follows:
“That all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the states, respectively, wherein such pilots may be, or with such laws as the states may respectively hereafter enact for the purpose, until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress.”
If the law of Pennsylvania now in question had been in existence at the date of this act of Congress, we might hold it to have been adopted by Congress, and thus made a law of the United States, and so valid. Because this act does, in effect, give the force of an act of Congress, to the then existing state laws on this subject, so long as they should continue unrepealed by the state which enacted them.
But the law on which these actions are founded was not enacted till 1803. What effect then can be attributed to so much of the act of 1789 as declares that pilots shall continue to be regulated in conformity,
“with such laws as the states may respectively hereafter enact for the purpose until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress?”
If the states were divested of the power to legislate on this subject by the grant of the commercial power to Congress, it is plain this act could not confer upon them power thus to legislate. If the Constitution excluded the states from making any law regulating commerce, certainly Congress cannot re-grant, or in any manner re-convey to the states that power. And yet this act of 1789 gives its sanction only to laws enacted by the states. This necessarily implies a constitutional power to legislate, for only a rule created by the sovereign power of a state acting in its legislative capacity can be deemed a law enacted by a state, and if the state has so limited its sovereign power that it no longer extends to a particular subject, manifestly it cannot, in any proper sense, be said to enact laws thereon. Entertaining these views, we are brought directly and unavoidably to the consideration of the question whether the grant of the commercial power to Congress did per se deprive the states of all power to regulate pilots. This question has never been decided by this court, nor, in our judgment, has any case depending upon all the considerations which must govern this one come before this court. The grant of commercial power to Congress does not contain any terms which expressly exclude the states from exercising an authority over its subject matter. If they are excluded, it must be because the nature of the power thus granted to Congress requires that a similar authority should not exist in the states. If it were conceded, on the one side, that the nature of this power, like that to legislate for the District of Columbia, is absolutely and totally repugnant to the existence of similar power in the states, probably no one would deny that the grant of the power to Congress as effectually and perfectly excludes the states from all future legislation on the subject as if express words had been used to exclude them. And, on the other hand, if it were admitted that the existence of this power in Congress, like the power of taxation, is compatible with the existence of a similar power in the states, then it would be in conformity with the contemporary exposition of the Constitution (Federalist, No. 32), and with the judicial construction given from time to time by this court, after the most deliberate consideration, to hold that the mere grant of such a power to Congress did not imply a prohibition on the states to exercise the same power, that it is not the mere existence of such a power, but its exercise by Congress, which may be incompatible with the exercise of the same power by the states, and that the states may legislate in the absence of congressional regulations …
Either absolutely to affirm or deny that the nature of this power requires exclusive legislation by Congress is to lose sight of the nature of the subjects of this power and to assert concerning all of them what is really applicable but to a part. Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. That this cannot be affirmed of laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage is plain …
It is the opinion of a majority of the court that the mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce did not deprive the states of power to regulate pilots, and that, although Congress has legislated on this subject, its legislation manifests an intention, with a single exception, not to regulate this subject, but to leave its regulation to the several states …
We are of opinion that this state law was enacted by virtue of a power residing in the state to legislate; that it is not in conflict with any law of Congress; that it does not interfere with any system which Congress has established by making regulations, or by intentionally leaving individuals to their own unrestricted action; that this law is therefore valid, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in each case must be affirmed.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona (1945)
325 U.S. 761 (1945)
Decision: Reversed
Vote: 7-2
Majority: Stone, joined by Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, Murphy and Jackson
Concurrence: Ruttledge
Dissent: Black
Dissent: Douglas
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Arizona Train Limit Law of May 16, 1912 … makes it unlawful for any person or corporation to operate within the state a railroad train of more than fourteen passenger or seventy freight cars, and authorizes the state to recover a money penalty for each violation of the Act. The questions for decision are whether Congress has, by legislative enactment, restricted the power of the states to regulate the length of interstate trains as a safety measure and, if not, whether the statute contravenes the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
In 1940, the State of Arizona brought suit in the Arizona Superior Court against appellant, the Southern Pacific Company, to recover the statutory penalties for operating within the state two interstate trains, one a passenger train of more than fourteen cars and one a freight train of more than seventy cars. Appellant answered, admitting the train operations but defended on the ground that the statute offends against the commerce clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and conflicts with federal legislation …
The [State] Supreme Court left undisturbed the findings of the trial court, and made no new findings. It held that the power of the state to regulate the length of interstate trains had not been restricted by Congressional action. It sustained the Act as a safety measure to reduce the number of accidents attributed to the operation of trains of more than the statutory maximum length, enacted by the state legislature in the exercise of its “police power.” This power the court held extended to the regulation of the operations of interstate commerce in the interests of local health, safety and wellbeing. It thought that a state statute, enacted in the exercise of the police power and bearing some reasonable relation to the health, safety and wellbeing of the people of the state, of which the state legislature is the judge, was not to be judicially overturned notwithstanding its admittedly adverse effect on the operation of interstate trains …
[T]he question here … whether the grant of power to the [Interstate Commerce] Commission operated to supersede the state act … We are of opinion that, in the absence of administrative implementation by the Commission, § 1 does not, of itself, curtail state power to regulate train lengths … Although the commerce clause conferred on the national government power to regulate commerce, its possession of the power does not exclude all state power of regulation … it has been recognized that, in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it … When the regulation of matters of local concern is local in character and effect, and its impact on the national commerce does not seriously interfere with its operation, and the consequent incentive to deal with them nationally is slight, such regulation has been generally held to be within state authority …
But ever since Gibbons v. Ogden, the states have not been deemed to have authority to impede substantially the free flow of commerce from state to state, or to regulate those phases of the national commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single authority …
In the application of these principles, some enactments may be found to be plainly within, and others plainly without, state power. But between these extremes lies the infinite variety of cases, in which regulation of local matters may also operate as a regulation of commerce, in which reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing demands of the state and national interests involved …
For a hundred years, it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that, in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is, under the commerce clause, the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests …
[I]n general, Congress has left it to the courts to formulate the rules thus interpreting the commerce clause in its application … and has been aware that, in their application, state laws will not be invalidated without the support of relevant factual material which will “afford a sure basis” for an informed judgment … Meanwhile, Congress has accommodated its legislation, as have the states, to these rules as an established feature of our constitutional system …
Hence, the matters for ultimate determination here are the nature and extent of the burden which the state regulation of interstate trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce …
The unchallenged findings leave no doubt that the Arizona Train Limit Law imposes a serious burden on the interstate commerce conducted by appellant. It materially impedes the movement of appellant’s interstate trains through that state, and interposes a substantial obstruction to the national policy proclaimed by Congress, to promote adequate, economical and efficient railway transportation service. Enforcement of the law in Arizona, while train lengths remain unregulated or are regulated by varying standards in other states, must inevitably result in an impairment of uniformity of efficient railroad operation, because the railroads are subjected to regulation which is not uniform in its application. Compliance with a state statute limiting train lengths requires interstate trains of a length lawful in other states to be broken up and reconstituted as they enter each state according as it may impose varying limitations upon train lengths. The alternative is for the carrier to conform to the lowest train limit restriction of any of the states through which its trains pass, whose laws thus control the carriers’ operations both within and without the regulating state …
The trial court found that the Arizona law had no reasonable relation to safety, and made train operation more dangerous. Examination of the evidence and the detailed findings makes it clear that this conclusion was rested on facts found which indicate that such increased danger of accident and personal injury as may result from the greater length of trains is more than offset by the increase in the number of accidents resulting from the larger number of trains when train lengths are reduced. In considering the effect of the statute as a safety measure, therefore, the factor of controlling significance for present purposes is not whether there is basis for the conclusion of the Arizona Supreme Court that the increase in length of trains beyond the statutory maximum has an adverse effect upon safety of operation. The decisive question is whether, in the circumstances, the total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it and subject it to local regulation which does not have a uniform effect on the interstate train journey which it interrupts …
… The accident rate in Arizona is much higher than on comparable lines elsewhere, where there is no regulation of length of trains. The record lends support to the trial court’s conclusion that the train length limitation increased, rather than diminished, the number of accidents …
We think, as the trial court found, that the Arizona Train Limit Law, viewed as a safety measure, affords, at most, slight and dubious advantage, if any, over unregulated train lengths, because it results in an increase in the number of trains and train operations and the consequent increase in train accidents … Its undoubted effect on the commerce is the regulation, without securing uniformity, of the length of trains operated in interstate commerce, which lack is itself a primary cause of preventing the free flow of commerce by delaying it and by substantially increasing its cost and impairing its efficiency. In these respects, the case differs from those where a state, by regulatory measures affecting the commerce, has removed or reduced safety hazards without substantial interference with the interstate movement of trains.
Here, we conclude that the state does go too far. Its regulation of train lengths … passes beyond what is plainly essential for safety, since it does not appear that it will lessen, rather than increase, the danger of accident. Its attempted regulation of the operation of interstate trains cannot establish nationwide control such as is essential to the maintenance of an efficient transportation system, which Congress alone can prescribe. The state interest cannot be preserved at the expense of the national interest by an enactment which regulates interstate train lengths without securing such control, which is a matter of national concern …
The state is responsible for their safe and economical administration. Regulations affecting the safety of their use must be applied alike to intrastate and interstate traffic. The fact that they affect alike shippers in interstate and intrastate commerce in great numbers, within as well as without the state, is a safeguard against regulatory abuses. Their regulation is akin to quarantine measures, game laws, and like local [laws] … with respect to which the state has exceptional scope for the exercise of its regulatory power, and which, Congress not acting, have been sustained even though they materially interfere with interstate commerce …
Here, examination of all the relevant factors makes it plain that the state interest is outweighed by the interest of the nation in an adequate, economical, and efficient railway transportation service, which must prevail.
Reversed.
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977)
432 U.S. 333 (1977)
Decision: Affirmed
Vote: 8-0
Majority: Burger, joined by Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens
Not participating: Rehnquist
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1973, North Carolina enacted a statute which required, inter alia, all closed containers of apples sold, offered for sale, or shipped into the State to bear “no grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or standard.” … In an action brought by the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, a three-judge Federal District Court invalidated the statute insofar as it prohibited the display of Washington State apple grades on the ground that it unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce …
Washington State is the Nation’s largest producer of apples, its crops accounting for approximately 30% of all apples grown domestically and nearly half of all apples shipped in closed containers in interstate commerce … Because of the importance of the apple industry to the State, its legislature has undertaken to protect and enhance the reputation of Washington apples by establishing a stringent mandatory inspection program, administered by the State’s Department of Agriculture, which requires all apples shipped in interstate commerce to be tested under strict quality standards and graded accordingly. In all cases, the Washington State grades, which have gained substantial acceptance in the trade, are the equivalent of, or superior to, the comparable grades and standards adopted by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Compliance with the Washington inspection scheme costs the State’s growers approximately $1 million each year.
In addition to the inspection program, the state legislature has sought to enhance the market for Washington apples through the creation of a state agency, the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, charged with the statutory duty of promoting and protecting the State’s apple industry. The Commission itself is composed of 13 Washington apple growers and dealers who are nominated and elected within electoral districts by their fellow growers and dealers …
Since the ultimate destination of these apples is unknown at the time they are placed in storage, compliance with North Carolina’s unique regulation would have required Washington growers to obliterate the printed labels on containers shipped to North Carolina, thus giving their product a damaged appearance. Alternatively, they could have changed their marketing practices to accommodate the needs of the North Carolina market, i.e., repack apples to be shipped to North Carolina in containers bearing only the USDA grade, and/or store the estimated portion of the harvest destined for that market in such special containers. As a last resort, they could discontinue the use of the preprinted containers entirely. None of these costly and less efficient options was very attractive to the industry. Moreover, in the event a number of other States followed North Carolina’s lead, the resultant inability to display the Washington grades could force the Washington growers to abandon the State’s expensive inspection and grading system which their customers had come to know and rely on over the 60-odd years of its existence …
[A]ppellants assert the Commission cannot rely on the injuries which the statute allegedly inflicts individually or collectively on Washington apple growers and dealers in order to confer standing on itself …
The only question presented, therefore, is whether, on this record, the Commission’s status as a state agency, rather than a traditional voluntary membership organization, precludes it from asserting the claims of the Washington apple growers and dealers who form its constituency. We think not. The Commission, while admittedly a state agency, for all practical purposes performs the functions of a traditional trade association representing the Washington apple industry. As previously noted, its purpose is the protection and promotion of the Washington apple industry; and, in the pursuit of that end, it has engaged in advertising, market research and analysis, public education campaigns, and scientific research. It thus serves a specialized segment of the State’s economic community which is the primary beneficiary of its activities, including the prosecution of this kind of litigation …
Here the record demonstrates that the growers and dealers have suffered and will continue to suffer losses of various types. For example, there is evidence supporting the District Court’s finding that individual growers and shippers lost accounts in North Carolina as a direct result of the statute. Obviously, those lost sales could lead to diminished profits. There is also evidence to support the finding that individual growers and dealers incurred substantial costs in complying with the statute … Such costs of compliance are properly considered in computing the amount in controversy …
We turn finally to the appellants’ claim that the District Court erred in holding that the North Carolina statute violated the Commerce Clause insofar as it prohibited the display of Washington State grades on closed containers of apples shipped into the State. Appellants do not really contest the District Court’s determination that the challenged statute burdened the Washington apple industry by increasing its costs of doing business in the North Carolina market and causing it to lose accounts there. Rather, they maintain that any such burdens on the interstate sale of Washington apples were far outweighed by the local benefits flowing from what they contend was a valid exercise of North Carolina’s inherent police powers designed to protect its citizenry from fraud and deception in the marketing of apples …
As the District Court correctly found, the challenged statute has the practical effect of not only burdening interstate sales of Washington apples, but also discriminating against them. This discrimination takes various forms. The first, and most obvious, is the statute’s consequence of raising the costs of doing business in the North Carolina market for Washington apple growers and dealers, while leaving those of their North Carolina counterparts unaffected. As previously noted, this disparate effect results from the fact that North Carolina apple producers, unlike their Washington competitors, were not forced to alter their marketing practices in order to comply with the statute. They were still free to market their wares under the USDA grade or none at all, as they had done prior to the statute’s enactment. Obviously, the increased costs imposed by the statute would tend to shield the local apple industry from the competition of Washington apple growers and dealers who are already at a competitive disadvantage because of their great distance from the North Carolina market.
Second, the statute has the effect of stripping away from the Washington apple industry the competitive and economic advantages it has earned for itself through its expensive inspection and grading system. The record demonstrates that the Washington apple grading system has gained nationwide acceptance in the apple trade. Indeed, it contains numerous affidavits from apple brokers and dealers located both inside and outside of North Carolina who state their preference, and that of their customers, for apples graded under the Washington, as opposed to the USDA, system because of the former’s greater consistency, its emphasis on color, and its supporting mandatory inspections. Once again, the statute had no similar impact on the North Carolina apple industry, and thus operated to its benefit.
Third, by prohibiting Washington growers and dealers from marketing apples under their State’s grades, the statute has a leveling effect which insidiously operates to the advantage of local apple producers. As noted earlier, the Washington State grades are equal or superior to the USDA grades in all corresponding categories. Hence, with free market forces at work, Washington sellers would normally enjoy a distinct market advantage vis-a-vis local producers in those categories where the Washington grade is superior. However, because of the statute’s operation, Washington apples which would otherwise qualify for and be sold under the superior Washington grades will now have to be marketed under their inferior USDA counterparts. Such “downgrading” offers the North Carolina apple industry the very sort of protection against competing out-of-state products that the Commerce Clause was designed to prohibit. At worst, it will have the effect of an embargo against those Washington apples in the superior grades as Washington dealers withhold them from the North Carolina market. At best, it will deprive Washington sellers of the market premium that such apples would otherwise command.
Despite the statute’s facial neutrality, the Commission suggests that its discriminatory impact on interstate commerce was not an unintended byproduct, and there are some indications in the record to that effect. The most glaring is the response of the North Carolina Agriculture Commissioner to the Commission’s request for an exemption following the statute’s passage in which he indicated that, before he could support such an exemption, he would “want to have the sentiment from our apple producers, since they were mainly responsible for this legislation being passed … ” (emphasis added). Moreover, we find it somewhat suspect that North Carolina singled out only closed containers of apples, the very means by which apples are transported in commerce, to effectuate the statute’s ostensible consumer protection purpose when apples are not generally sold at retail in their shipping containers.
In addition, it appears that nondiscriminatory alternatives to the outright ban of Washington State grades are readily available. For example, North Carolina could effectuate its goal by permitting out-of-state growers to utilize state grades only if they also marked their shipments with the applicable USDA label. In that case, the USDA grade would serve as a benchmark against which the consumer could evaluate the quality of the various state grades. If this alternative was for some reason inadequate to eradicate problems caused by state grades inferior to those adopted by the USDA, North Carolina might consider banning those state grades which, unlike Washington’s, could not be demonstrated to be equal or superior to the corresponding USDA categories. Concededly, even in this latter instance, some potential for “confusion” might persist. However, it is the type of “confusion” that the national interest in the free flow of goods between the States demands be tolerated.
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
Maine v. Taylor (1986)
477 U.S. 131 (1986)
Decision: Reversed
Vote: 8-1
Majority: Blackmun, joined by Burger, Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor
Dissent: Stevens
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Once again, a little fish has caused a commotion … The fish in this case is the golden shiner, a species of minnow commonly used as live bait in sport fishing.
Appellee Robert J. Taylor (hereafter Taylor or appellee) operates a bait business in Maine. Despite a Maine statute prohibiting the importation of live baitfish … he arranged to have 158,000 live golden shiners delivered to him from outside the State. The shipment was intercepted, and a federal grand jury in the District of Maine indicted Taylor for violating and conspiring to violate the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 … Section 3(a)(2)(A) of those Amendments, makes it a federal crime “to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce … any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law.”
Taylor moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Maine’s import ban unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce, and therefore may not form the basis for a federal prosecution under the Lacey Act. Maine … intervened to defend the validity of its statute, arguing that the ban legitimately protects the State’s fisheries from parasites and nonnative species that might be included in shipments of live baitfish. The District Court found the statute constitutional, and denied the motion to dismiss … Taylor then entered a conditional plea of guilty … reserving the right to appeal the District Court’s ruling on the constitutional question. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, agreeing with Taylor that the underlying state statute impermissibly restricts interstate trade … Maine appealed. We set the case for plenary review …
In determining whether a State has overstepped its role in regulating interstate commerce, this Court has distinguished between state statutes that burden interstate transactions only incidentally and those that affirmatively discriminate against such transactions. While statutes in the first group violate the Commerce Clause only if the burdens they impose on interstate trade are “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits,” Pike v. Bruce Church Inc (1970) … statutes in the second group are subject to more demanding scrutiny. The Court explained in Hughes v. Oklahoma, (1979), that once a state law is shown to discriminate against interstate commerce “either on its face or in practical effect,” the burden falls on the State to demonstrate both that the statute “serves a legitimate local purpose” and that this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means …
The District Court and the Court of Appeals both reasoned correctly that, since Maine’s import ban discriminates on its face against interstate trade, it should be subject to the strict requirements of Hughes v. Oklahoma, notwithstanding Maine’s argument that those requirements were waived by the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981. It is well established that Congress may authorize the States to engage in regulation that the Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid. But because of the important role the Commerce Clause plays in protecting the free flow of interstate trade, this Court has exempted state statutes from the implied limitations of the Clause only when the congressional direction to do so has been “unmistakably clear.” South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, (1984) …
In this case, there simply is no unambiguous statement of any congressional intent whatsoever “to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause,” United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n of California, (1953) …
Maine’s ban on the importation of live baitfish thus is constitutional only if it satisfies the requirements ordinarily applied under Hughes v. Oklahoma to local regulation that discriminates against interstate trade: the statute must serve a legitimate local purpose, and the purpose must be one that cannot be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means …
The evidentiary hearing on which the District Court based its conclusions was one before a Magistrate. Three scientific experts testified for the prosecution, and one for the defense. The prosecution experts testified that live baitfish imported into the State posed two significant threats to Maine’s unique and fragile fisheries … First, Maine’s population of wild fish — including its own indigenous golden shiners — would be placed at risk by three types of parasites prevalent in out-of-state baitfish, but not common to wild fish in Maine … Second, nonnative species inadvertently included in shipments of live baitfish could disturb Maine’s aquatic ecology to an unpredictable extent by competing with native fish for food or habitat, by preying on native species, or by disrupting the environment in more subtle ways …
Although statistical sampling and inspection techniques had been developed for salmonids (i.e., salmon and trout), so that a shipment could be certified parasite-free based on a standardized examination of only some of the fish, no scientifically accepted procedures of this sort were available for baitfish …
After reviewing the expert testimony presented to the Magistrate, however, we cannot say that the District Court clearly erred in finding that substantial scientific uncertainty surrounds the effect that baitfish parasites and nonnative species could have on Maine’s fisheries. Moreover, we agree with the District Court that Maine has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the possibility that they may ultimately prove to be negligible …
Nor do we think that much doubt is cast on the legitimacy of Maine’s purposes by what the Court of Appeals took to be signs of protectionist intent. Shielding in-state industries from out-of-state competition is almost never a legitimate local purpose, and state laws that amount to “simple economic protectionism” consequently have been subject to a “virtually per se rule of invalidity.” … But there is little reason in this case to believe that the legitimate justifications the State has put forward for its statute are merely a sham or a “post hoc rationalization.” …
The Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of States and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce, but it does not elevate free trade above all other values. As long as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to “place itself in a position of economic isolation,” Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., (1935), it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources. The evidence in this case amply supports the District Court’s findings that Maine’s ban on the importation of live baitfish serves legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives. This is not a case of arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce; the record suggests that Maine has legitimate reasons, “apart from their origin, to treat [out-of-state baitfish] differently,” Philadelphia v. New Jersey, (1978). The judgment of the Court of Appeals setting aside appellee’s conviction is therefore reversed.
It is so ordered.
Reno v. Condon (2000)
528 U.S. 141 (2000)
Decision: Reversed
Vote: 9-0
Majority: Rehnquist,, joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
…
The DPPA [Driver’s Privacy Protection Act] regulates the disclosure and resale of personal information contained in the records of state DMVs [Department of Motor Vehicles]. State DMVs require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person’s name, address, telephone number, vehicle description, Social Security number, medical information, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver’s license or registering an automobile. Congress found that many States, in turn, sell this personal information to individuals and businesses …
The DPPA’s ban on disclosure of personal information does not apply if drivers have consented to the release of their data. When we granted certiorari in this case, the DPPA provided that a DMV could obtain that consent either on a case-by-case basis or could imply consent if the State provided drivers with an opportunity to block disclosure of their personal information when they received or renewed their licenses and drivers did not avail themselves of that opportunity … However, Public Law 106-69 … which was signed into law on October 9, 1999, changed this “opt-out” alternative to an “opt-in” requirement. Under the amended DPPA, States may not imply consent from a driver’s failure to take advantage of a state-afforded opportunity to block disclosure, but must rather obtain a driver’s affirmative consent to disclose the driver’s personal information for use in surveys, marketing, solicitations, and other restricted purposes …
South Carolina law conflicts with the DPPA’s provisions.
Under that law, the information contained in the State’s DMV records is available to any person or entity that fills out a form listing the requester’s name and address and stating that the information will not be used for telephone solicitation … South Carolina’s DMV retains a copy of all requests for information from the State’s motor vehicle records, and it is required to release copies of all requests relating to a person upon that person’s written petition … State law authorizes the South Carolina DMV to charge a fee for releasing motor vehicle information, and it requires the DMV to allow drivers to prohibit the use of their motor vehicle information for certain commercial activities.
Following the DPPA’s enactment, South Carolina and its Attorney General, respondent Condon, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging that the DPPA violates the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the United States Constitution. The District Court concluded that the Act is incompatible with the principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution’s division of power between the States and the Federal Government …
The United States asserts that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause … The United States bases its Commerce Clause argument on the fact that the personal, identifying information that the DPPA regulates is a “thin[g] in interstate commerce,” and that the sale or release of that information in interstate commerce is therefore a proper subject of congressional regulation … We agree with the United States’ contention. The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold is used by insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers with customized solicitations. The information is also used in the stream of interstate commerce by various public and private entities for matters related to interstate motoring. Because drivers’ information is, in this context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulation …
But the fact that drivers’ personal information is, in the context of this case, an article in interstate commerce does not conclusively resolve the constitutionality of the DPPA. In New York v. United States (1992) and Printz v. United States (1997), we held federal statutes invalid, not because Congress lacked legislative authority over the subject matter, but because those statutes violated the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment …
We agree with South Carolina’s assertion that the DPPA’s provisions will require time and effort on the part of state employees, but reject the State’s argument that the DPPA violates the principles laid down in either New York or Printz. We think, instead, that this case is governed by our decision in South Carolina v. Baker, (1988) …
Like the statute at issue in Baker, the DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates the States as the owners of data bases. It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals. We accordingly conclude that the DPPA is consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in New York and Printz.
As a final matter, we turn to South Carolina’s argument that the DPPA is unconstitutional because it regulates the States exclusively. The essence of South Carolina’s argument is that Congress may only regulate the States by means of “generally applicable” laws, or laws that apply to individuals as well as States. But we need not address the question whether general applicability is a constitutional requirement for federal regulation of the States, because the DPPA is generally applicable. The DPPA regulates the universe of entities that participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information-the States as initial suppliers of the information in interstate commerce and private resellers or redisclosers of that information in commerce.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
Granholm v. Heald (2005)
544 U.S. 460 (2005)
Decision: Affirmed
Vote: 5-5
Majority: Kennedy, joined by Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
Dissent: Stevens, joined by O’Connor
Dissent: Thomas, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens and O’Connor
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
These consolidated cases present challenges to state laws regulating the sale of wine from out-of-state wineries to consumers in Michigan and New York. The details and mechanics of the two regulatory schemes differ, but the object and effect of the laws are the same: to allow in-state wineries to sell wine directly to consumers in that State but to prohibit out-of-state wineries from doing so, or, at the least, to make direct sales impractical from an economic standpoint. It is evident that the object and design of the Michigan and New York statutes is to grant in-state wineries a competitive advantage over wineries located beyond the States’ borders.
We hold that the laws in both States discriminate against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, §8, cl. 3, and that the discrimination is neither authorized nor permitted by the Twenty-first Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which invalidated the Michigan laws; and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which upheld the New York laws.
Like many other States, Michigan and New York regulate the sale and importation of alcoholic beverages, including wine, through a three-tier distribution system. Separate licenses are required for producers, wholesalers, and retailers … The three-tier scheme is preserved by a complex set of overlapping state and federal regulations … We have held previously that States can mandate a three-tier distribution scheme in the exercise of their authority under the Twenty-first Amendment. North Dakota v. United States (1990) … As relevant to today’s cases, though, the three-tier system is, in broad terms and with refinements to be discussed, mandated by Michigan and New York only for sales from out-of-state wineries. In-state wineries, by contrast, can obtain a license for direct sales to consumers. The differential treatment between in-state and out-of-state wineries constitutes explicit discrimination against interstate commerce.
This discrimination substantially limits the direct sale of wine to consumers, an otherwise emerging and significant business …
Approximately 26 States allow some direct shipping of wine, with various restrictions. Thirteen of these States have reciprocity laws, which allow direct shipment from wineries outside the State, provided the State of origin affords similar nondiscriminatory treatment. Id., at 7—8. In many parts of the country, however, state laws that prohibit or severely restrict direct shipments deprive consumers of access to the direct market. According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), “[s]tate bans on interstate direct shipping represent the single largest regulatory barrier to expanded e-commerce in wine.” Id., at 3.
The wine producers in the cases before us are small wineries that rely on direct consumer sales as an important part of their businesses … Even if the winery could find a Michigan wholesaler to distribute its wine, the wholesaler’s markup would render shipment through the three-tier system economically infeasible.
We first address the background of the suit challenging the Michigan direct-shipment law. Most alcoholic beverages in Michigan are distributed through the State’s three-tier system. Producers or distillers of alcoholic beverages, whether located in state or out of state, generally may sell only to licensed in-state wholesalers … Licensed retailers are the final link in the chain, selling alcoholic beverages to consumers at retail locations and, subject to certain restrictions, through home delivery.
Under Michigan law, wine producers, as a general matter, must distribute their wine through wholesalers. There is, however, an exception for Michigan’s approximately 40 in-state wineries, which are eligible for “wine maker” licenses that allow direct shipment to in-state consumers … The cost of the license varies with the size of the winery …
Some Michigan residents brought suit against various state officials in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan … The plaintiffs contended that Michigan’s direct-shipment laws discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause … Both the State and the wholesalers argued that the ban on direct shipment from out-of-state wineries is a valid exercise of Michigan’s power under §2 of the Twenty-first Amendment …
New York’s licensing scheme is somewhat different. It channels most wine sales through the three-tier system, but it too makes exceptions for in-state wineries. As in Michigan, the result is to allow local wineries to make direct sales to consumers in New York on terms not available to out-of-state wineries. Wineries that produce wine only from New York grapes can apply for a license that allows direct shipment to in-state consumers … These licensees are authorized to deliver the wines of other wineries as well, §76—a(6)(a), but only if the wine is made from grapes “at least seventy-five percent the volume of which were grown in New York state,” §3(20—a). An out-of-state winery may ship directly to New York consumers only if it becomes a licensed New York winery, which requires the establishment of “a branch factory, office or storeroom within the state of New York.” §3(37).
Juanita Swedenburg and David Lucas,, joined by three of their New York customers, brought suit in the Southern District of New York … seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the State’s limitations on the direct shipment of out-of-state wine violate the Commerce Clause. New York liquor wholesalers and representatives of New York liquor retailers intervened in support of the State …
We consolidated these cases and granted certiorari on the following question: “ ‘Does a State’s regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of §2 of the Twenty-first Amendment?’ ”
Time and again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.” Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., (1994). This rule is essential to the foundations of the Union. The mere fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a producer in one State from access to markets in other States …
The rule prohibiting state discrimination against interstate commerce follows also from the principle that States should not be compelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or disfavored status for their own citizens. States do not need, and may not attempt, to negotiate with other States regarding their mutual economic interests …
Laws of the type at issue in the instant cases contradict these principles. They deprive citizens of their right to have access to the markets of other States on equal terms. The perceived necessity for reciprocal sale privileges risks generating the trade rivalries and animosities, the alliances and exclusivity, that the Constitution and, in particular, the Commerce Clause were designed to avoid. State laws that protect local wineries have led to the enactment of statutes under which some States condition the right of out-of-state wineries to make direct wine sales to in-state consumers on a reciprocal right in the shipping State. California, for example, passed a reciprocity law in 1986, retreating from the State’s previous regime that allowed unfettered direct shipments from out-of-state wineries. Riekhof & Sykuta, 27 Regulation, No. 3, at 30. Prior to 1986, all but three States prohibited direct-shipments of wine. The obvious aim of the California statute was to open the interstate direct-shipping market for the State’s many wineries. Ibid. The current patchwork of laws–with some States banning direct shipments altogether, others doing so only for out-of-state wines, and still others requiring reciprocity–is essentially the product of an ongoing, low-level trade war. Allowing States to discriminate against out-of-state wine “invite[s] a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause.” Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, (1951).
The discriminatory character of the Michigan system is obvious. Michigan allows in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers, subject only to a licensing requirement. Out-of-state wineries, whether licensed or not, face a complete ban on direct shipment. The differential treatment requires all out-of-state wine, but not all in-state wine, to pass through an in-state wholesaler and retailer before reaching consumers. These two extra layers of overhead increase the cost of out-of-state wines to Michigan consumers. The cost differential, and in some cases the inability to secure a wholesaler for small shipments, can effectively bar small wineries from the Michigan market.
The New York regulatory scheme differs from Michigan’s in that it does not ban direct shipments altogether. Out-of-state wineries are instead required to establish a distribution operation in New York in order to gain the privilege of direct shipment. N. Y. ABC Law §§3(37), 96. This, though, is just an indirect way of subjecting out-of-state wineries, but not local ones, to the three-tier system. New York and those allied with its interests defend the scheme by arguing that an out-of-state winery has the same access to the State’s consumers as in-state wineries: All wine must be sold through a licensee fully accountable to New York; it just so happens that in order to become a licensee, a winery must have a physical presence in the State. There is some confusion over the precise steps out-of-state wineries must take to gain access to the New York market, in part because no winery has run the State’s regulatory gauntlet. New York’s argument, in any event, is unconvincing.
The New York scheme grants in-state wineries access to the State’s consumers on preferential terms …
In addition to its restrictive in-state presence requirement, New York discriminates against out-of-state wineries in other ways. Out-of-state wineries that establish the requisite branch office and warehouse in New York are still ineligible for a “farm winery” license, the license that provides the most direct means of shipping to New York consumers …
We have no difficulty concluding that New York, like Michigan, discriminates against interstate commerce through its direct-shipping laws.
… The two States, however, contend their statutes are saved by §2 of the Twenty-first Amendment …
The States’ position is inconsistent with our precedents and with the Twenty-first Amendment’s history. Section 2 does not allow States to regulate the direct shipment of wine on terms that discriminate in favor of in-state producers.
Before 1919, the temperance movement fought to curb the sale of alcoholic beverages one State at a time. The movement made progress, and many States passed laws restricting or prohibiting the sale of alcohol. This Court upheld state laws banning the production and sale of alcoholic beverages, Mugler v. Kansas, (1887), but was less solicitous of laws aimed at imports. In a series of cases before ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment the Court, relying on the Commerce Clause, invalidated a number of state liquor regulations.
These cases advanced two distinct principles. First, the Court held that the Commerce Clause prevented States from discriminating against imported liquor … Second, the Court held that the Commerce Clause prevented States from passing facially neutral laws that placed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce …
The ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919 provided a brief respite from the legal battles over the validity of state liquor regulations. With the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment 14 years later, however, nationwide Prohibition came to an end. Section 1 of the Twenty-first Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment is at issue here …
The aim of the Twenty-first Amendment was to allow States to maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its transportation, importation, and use. The Amendment did not give States the authority to pass nonuniform laws in order to discriminate against out-of-state goods, a privilege they had not enjoyed at any earlier time …
Our more recent cases, furthermore, confirm that the Twenty-first Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution and, in particular, does not displace the rule that States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own producers …
The modern §2 cases fall into three categories.
First, the Court has held that state laws that violate other provisions of the Constitution are not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment …
Second, the Court has held that §2 does not abrogate Congress’ Commerce Clause powers with regard to liquor …
Finally, and most relevant to the issue at hand, the Court has held that state regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause …
Our determination that the Michigan and New York direct-shipment laws are not authorized by the Twenty-first Amendment does not end the inquiry. We still must consider whether either State regime “advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” New Energy Co. of Ind … The States offer two primary justifications for restricting direct shipments from out-of-state wineries: keeping alcohol out of the hands of minors and facilitating tax collection. We consider each in turn.
The States, aided by several amici, claim that allowing direct shipment from out-of-state wineries undermines their ability to police underage drinking …
The States provide little evidence that the purchase of wine over the Internet by minors is a problem. Indeed, there is some evidence to the contrary … Second, minors who decide to disobey the law have more direct means of doing so. Third, direct shipping is an imperfect avenue of obtaining alcohol for minors who, in the words of the past president of the National Conference of State Liquor Administrators, “ ‘want instant gratification.’ ” …
Even were we to credit the States’ largely unsupported claim that direct shipping of wine increases the risk of underage drinking, this would not justify regulations limiting only out-of-state direct shipments. As the wineries point out, minors are just as likely to order wine from in-state producers as from out-of-state ones …
The States’ tax-collection justification is also insufficient. Increased direct shipping, whether originating in state or out of state, brings with it the potential for tax evasion … New York and its supporting parties also advance a tax-collection justification for the State’s direct-shipment laws. While their concerns are not wholly illusory, their regulatory objectives can be achieved without discriminating against interstate commerce. In particular, New York could protect itself against lost tax revenue by requiring a permit as a condition of direct shipping. This is the approach taken by New York for in-state wineries. The State offers no reason to believe the system would prove ineffective for out-of-state wineries …
In summary, the States provide little concrete evidence for the sweeping assertion that they cannot police direct shipments by out-of-state wineries. Our Commerce Clause cases demand more than mere speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods …
States have broad power to regulate liquor under §2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. This power, however, does not allow States to ban, or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-state producers. If a State chooses to allow direct shipment of wine, it must do so on evenhanded terms. Without demonstrating the need for discrimination, New York and Michigan have enacted regulations that disadvantage out-of-state wine producers. Under our Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these regulations cannot stand.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
It is so ordered.
National Pork Producers Council v. Ross (2023)
598 U.S. ___ (2023)
Decision: Affirmed
Vote: 9-0
Majority/Plurality: Gorsuch,, joined by Thomas; Barrett (Parts I, II, III, IV-A, IV-B, IV-D, and V); Sotomayor, Kagan (Parts I, II, III, IV-A, IV-C, and V)
Concurrence: Sotomayor (in part),, joined by Kagan
Concurrence: Barrett (in part)
Concur/dissent: Roberts,, joined by Alito, Kavanaugh, Jackson
Concur/dissent: Kavanaugh
Justice Gorsuch announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Parts IV–B, IV–C, and IV–D.
What goods belong in our stores? Usually, consumer demand and local laws supply some of the answer. Recently, California adopted just such a law banning the in-state sale of certain pork products derived from breeding pigs confined in stalls so small they cannot lie down, stand up, or turn around. In response, two groups of out-of-state pork producers filed this lawsuit, arguing that the law unconstitutionally interferes with their preferred way of doing business in violation of this Court’s dormant Commerce Clause precedents. Both the district court and court of appeals dismissed the producers’ complaint for failing to state a claim …
Modern American grocery stores offer a dizzying array of choice … Products may be marketed as free range, wild caught, or graded by quality (prime, choice, select, and beyond). The pork products at issue here, too, sometimes come with “antibiotic-free” and “crate-free” labels … Much of this product differentiation reflects consumer demand, informed by individual taste, health, or moral considerations …
This case involves a challenge to a California law known as Proposition 12. In November 2018 and with the support of about 63% of participating voters, California adopted a ballot initiative that revised the State’s existing standards for the in-state sale of eggs and announced new standards for the in-state sale of pork and veal products … As relevant here, Proposition 12 forbids the in-state sale of whole pork meat that comes from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are “confined in a cruel manner … ”
A spirited debate preceded the vote on Proposition 12. Proponents observed that, in some farming operations, pregnant pigs remain “[e]ncased” for 16 weeks in “fit-to-size” metal crates … These animals may receive their only opportunity for exercise when they are moved to a separate barn to give birth and later returned for another 16 weeks of pregnancy confinement—with the cycle repeating until the pigs are slaughtered. Proponents hoped that Proposition 12 would go a long way toward eliminating pork sourced in this manner “from the California marketplace … ” Proponents also suggested that the law would have health benefits for consumers because “packing animals in tiny, filthy cages increases the risk of food poisoning.
Opponents pressed their case in strong terms too. They argued that existing farming practices did a better job of protecting animal welfare (for example, by preventing pig-on-pig aggression) and ensuring consumer health (by avoiding contamination) than Proposition 12 would … They also warned voters that Proposition 12 would require some farmers and processors to incur new costs. Ones that might be “passed through” to California consumers …
The Constitution vests Congress with the power to “regulate Commerce … among the several States.” Art. I, §8, cl. 3. Everyone agrees that Congress may seek to exercise this power to regulate the interstate trade of pork, much as it has done with various other products. Everyone agrees, too, that congressional enactments may preempt conflicting state laws. But everyone also agrees that we have nothing like that here. Despite the persistent efforts of certain pork producers, Congress has yet to adopt any statute that might displace Proposition 12 or laws regulating pork production in other States …
Reading between the Constitution’s lines, petitioners observe, this Court has held that the Commerce Clause not only vests Congress with the power to regulate interstate trade; the Clause also “contain[s] a further, negative command,” one effectively forbidding the enforcement of “certain state [economic regulations] even when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., (1995) …
In its “modern” cases, this Court has said that the Commerce Clause prohibits the enforcement of state laws “driven by … ‘economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors … ’”
Even under our received dormant Commerce Clause case law, petitioners begin in a tough spot. They do not allege that California’s law seeks to advantage in-state firms or disadvantage out-of-state rivals. In fact, petitioners disavow any discrimination-based claim, conceding that Proposition 12 imposes the same burdens on in-state pork producers that it imposes on out-of-state ones. As petitioners put it, “the dormant Commerce Clause … bar on protectionist state statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce … is not in issue here.”
Having conceded that California’s law does not implicate the antidiscrimination principle at the core of this Court’s dormant Commerce Clause cases, petitioners are left to pursue two more ambitious theories. In the first, petitioners invoke what they call “extraterritoriality doctrine.” Id., at 19. They contend that our dormant Commerce Clause cases suggest an additional and “almost per se” rule forbidding enforcement of state laws that have the “practical effect of controlling commerce outside the State,” even when those laws do not purposely discriminate against out-of-state economic interests. Ibid. Petitioners further insist that Proposition 12 offends this “almost per se” rule because the law will impose substantial new costs on out-of-state pork producers who wish to sell their products in California …
Petitioners say the “almost per se” rule they propose follows ineluctably from three cases …
On their account, Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig (1935), Brown-Forman v. New York State Liquor Authority (1986), and Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) didn’t just find an impermissible discriminatory purpose in the challenged laws; they also suggested an “almost per se” rule against state laws with “extraterritorial effects … ”
In our view, however, petitioners read too much into too little … [T]he Court explained that the challenged statutes had a specific impermissible “extraterritorial effect”—they deliberately “prevent[ed out-of-state firms] from undertaking competitive pricing” or “deprive[d] businesses and consumers in other States of ‘whatever competitive advantages they may possess … ’ ”
In recognizing this much, we say nothing new. This Court has already described “[t]he rule that was applied in Baldwin and Healy” as addressing “price control or price affirmation statutes” that tied “the price of … in-state products to out-of-state prices … ”
Consider, too, the strange places petitioners’ alternative interpretation could lead. In our interconnected national marketplace, many (maybe most) state laws have the “practical effect of controlling” extraterritorial behavior. State income tax laws lead some individuals and companies to relocate to other jurisdictions … Nor, as we have seen, is this a recent development. Since the founding, States have enacted an “immense mass” of “[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, [and] health laws of every description” that have a “considerable” influence on commerce outside their borders. Petitioners’ “almost per se” rule against laws that have the “practical effect” of “controlling” extraterritorial commerce would cast a shadow over laws long understood to represent valid exercises of the States’ constitutionally reserved powers. It would provide neither courts nor litigants with meaningful guidance in how to resolve disputes over them. Instead, it would invite endless litigation and inconsistent results. Can anyone really suppose Baldwin, Brown-Forman, and Healy meant to do so much?
…
In rejecting petitioners’ “almost per se” theory we do not mean to trivialize the role territory and sovereign boundaries play in our federal system. But, by way of example, no one should think that one State may adopt a law exempting securities held by the residents of a second State from taxation in that second State. Bonaparte v. Tax Court, (1882). Nor, we have held, should anyone think one State may prosecute the citizen of another State for acts committed “outside [the first State’s] jurisdiction” that are not “intended to produce [or that do not] produc[e] detrimental effects within it.” Strassheim v. Daily (1911) …
The antidiscrimination principle found in our dormant Commerce Clause cases may well represent one more effort to mediate competing claims of sovereign authority under our horizontal separation of powers. But none of this means, as petitioners suppose, that any question about the ability of a State to project its power extraterritorially must yield to an “almost per se” rule under the dormant Commerce Clause. This Court has never before claimed so much “ground for judicial supremacy under the banner of the dormant Commerce Clause.” United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, (2007). We see no reason to change course now.
Failing in their first theory, petitioners retreat to a second they associate with Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., (1970). Under Pike, they say, a court must at least assess “ ‘the burden imposed on interstate commerce’ ” by a state law and prevent its enforcement if the law’s burdens are “ ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’ ” Petitioners then rattle off a litany of reasons why they believe the benefits Proposition 12 secures for Californians do not outweigh the costs it imposes on out-of-state economic interests …
As this Court has previously explained, “no clear line” separates the Pike line of cases from our core antidiscrimination precedents. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 12 (1997). While many of our dormant Commerce Clause cases have asked whether a law exhibits “ ‘facial discrimination,’ ” “several cases that have purported to apply [Pike,] including Pike itself,” have “turned in whole or in part on the discriminatory character of the challenged state regulations.” Ibid. In other words, if some of our cases focus on whether a state law discriminates on its face, the Pike line serves as an important reminder that a law’s practical effects may also disclose the presence of a discriminatory purpose …
Nor does any of this help petitioners in this case. They not only disavow any claim that Proposition 12 discriminates on its face. They nowhere suggest that an examination of Proposition 12’s practical effects in operation would disclose purposeful discrimination against out-of-state businesses. While this Court has left the “courtroom door open” to challenges premised on “even nondiscriminatory burdens,” Dept. of Revenue of Ky v. Davis, (2008) and while “a small number of our cases have invalidated state laws … that appear to have been genuinely nondiscriminatory,” Tracy, petitioners’ claim falls well outside Pike’s heartland …
They urge us to read Pike as authorizing judges to strike down duly enacted state laws regulating the in-state sale of ordinary consumer goods (like pork) based on nothing more than their own assessment of the relevant law’s “costs” and “benefits.”
That we can hardly do. Whatever other judicial authorities the Commerce Clause may imply, that kind of freewheeling power is not among them. Petitioners point to nothing in the Constitution’s text or history that supports such a project. And our cases have expressly cautioned against judges using the dormant Commerce Clause as “a roving license for federal courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local government to undertake.” United Haulers …
This Court has also recognized that judges often are “not institutionally suited to draw reliable conclusions of the kind that would be necessary … to satisfy [the] Pike” test as petitioners conceive it. Davis …
On the “cost” side of the ledger, petitioners allege they will face increased production expenses because of Proposition 12. On the “benefits” side, petitioners acknowledge that Californians voted for Proposition 12 to vindicate a variety of interests, many noneconomic … How is a court supposed to compare or weigh economic costs (to some) against noneconomic benefits (to others)? No neutral legal rule guides the way. The competing goods before us are insusceptible to resolution by reference to any juridical principle. Really, the task is like being asked to decide “whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
Faced with this problem, petitioners reply that we should heavily discount the benefits of Proposition 12. They say that California has little interest in protecting the welfare of animals raised elsewhere and the law’s health benefits are overblown. But along the way, petitioners offer notable concessions too. They acknowledge that States may sometimes ban the in-state sale of products they deem unethical or immoral without regard to where those products are made …
So even accepting everything petitioners say, we remain left with a task no court is equipped to undertake. On the one hand, some out-of-state producers who choose to comply with Proposition 12 may incur new costs. On the other hand, the law serves moral and health interests of some (disputable) magnitude for in-state residents. Some might reasonably find one set of concerns more compelling. Others might fairly disagree. How should we settle that dispute? The competing goods are incommensurable. Your guess is as good as ours …
If, as petitioners insist, California’s law really does threaten a “massive” disruption of the pork industry … pig husbandry really does “ ‘imperatively demand’ ” a single uniform nationwide rule … they are free to petition Congress to intervene. Under the (wakeful) Commerce Clause, that body enjoys the power to adopt federal legislation that may preempt conflicting state laws. That body is better equipped than this Court to identify and assess all the pertinent economic and political interests at play across the country. And that body is certainly better positioned to claim democratic support for any policy choice it may make. But so far, Congress has declined the producers’ sustained entreaties for new legislation …
Petitioners would have us cast aside caution for boldness. They have failed—repeatedly—to persuade Congress to use its express Commerce Clause authority to adopt a uniform rule for pork production. And they disavow any reliance on this Court’s core dormant Commerce Clause teachings focused on discriminatory state legislation. Instead, petitioners invite us to endorse two new theories of implied judicial power. They would have us recognize an “almost per se” rule against the enforcement of state laws that have “extraterritorial effects”—even though this Court has recognized since Gibbons that virtually all state laws create ripple effects beyond their borders. Alternatively, they would have us prevent a State from regulating the sale of an ordinary consumer good within its own borders on nondiscriminatory terms—even though the Pike line of cases they invoke has never before yielded such a result. Like the courts that faced this case before us, we decline both of petitioners’ incautious invitations.
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is
Affirmed.