Fifth Amendment
What Constitutes Custody?
Oregon v. Mathiason (1966)
384 U.S. 436 (1966)
Vote: 6-3
Decision: Reversed and remanded
Majority: Per Curiam
Dissent: Brennan
Dissent: Marshall
Dissent: Stevens
PER CURIAM
Respondent Carl Mathiason was convicted of first-degree burglary after a bench trial in which his confession was critical to the State’s case. At trial, he moved to suppress the confession as the fruit of questioning by the police not preceded by the warnings required in Miranda v. Arizona, (1966). The trial court refused to exclude the confession because it found that Mathiason was not in custody at the time of the confession.
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed respondent’s conviction, but, on his petition for review in the Supreme Court of Oregon, that court, by a divided vote, reversed the conviction. It found that, although Mathiason had not been arrested or otherwise formally detained, “the interrogation took place in a coercive environment'” of the sort to which Miranda was intended to apply. …
The State of Oregon has … petitioned for certiorari to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon. We think that court has read Miranda too broadly, and we therefore reverse its judgment.
The Supreme Court of Oregon described the factual situation surrounding the confession as follows:
“An officer of the State Police investigated a theft at a residence near Pendleton. He asked the lady of the house which had been burglarized if she suspected anyone. She replied that the defendant was the only one she could think of. The defendant was a parolee and a ‘close associate’ of her son. The officer tried to contact defendant on three or four occasions with no success. Finally, about 25 days after the burglary, the officer left his card at defendant’s apartment with a note asking him to call because ‘I’d like to discuss something with you.’ The next afternoon, the defendant did call. The officer asked where it would be convenient to meet. The defendant had no preference, so the officer asked if the defendant could meet him at the state patrol office in about an hour and a half, about 5:00 p.m. The patrol office was about two blocks from defendant’s apartment. The building housed several state agencies.”
“The officer met defendant in the hallway, shook hands and took him into an office. The defendant was told he was not under arrest. The door was closed. The two sat across a desk. The police radio in another room could be heard. The officer told defendant he wanted to talk to him about a burglary, and that his truthfulness would possibly be considered by the district attorney or judge. The officer further advised that the police believed defendant was involved in the burglary and defendant’s fingerprints were found at the scene. The defendant sat for a few minutes and then said he had taken the property. This occurred within five minutes after defendant had come to the office. The officer then advised defendant of his Miranda rights and took a taped confession.”
“At the end of the taped conversation, the officer told defendant he was not arresting him at this time; he was released to go about his job and return to his family. The officer said he was referring the case to the district attorney for him to determine whether criminal charges would be brought. It was 5:30 p.m. when the defendant left the office.”
“The officer gave all the testimony relevant to this issue. The defendant did not take the stand either at the hearing on the motion to suppress or at the trial.”
The Supreme Court of Oregon reasoned from these facts that:
“We hold the interrogation took place in a ‘coercive environment.’ The parties were in the offices of the State Police; they were alone behind closed doors; the officer informed the defendant he was a suspect in a theft and the authorities had evidence incriminating him in the crime; and the defendant was a parolee under supervision. We are of the opinion that this evidence is not overcome by the evidence that the defendant came to the office in response to a request and was told he was not under arrest.”
Our decision in Miranda set forth rules of police procedure applicable to “custodial interrogation.”
“By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Subsequently, we have found the Miranda principle applicable to questioning which takes place in a prison setting during a suspect’s term of imprisonment on a separate offense, Mathis v. United States (1968), and to questioning taking place in a suspect’s home after he has been arrested and is no longer free to go where he pleases, Orozco v. Texas (1969).
In the present case, however, there is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent’s freedom to depart was restricted in any way. He came voluntarily to the police station, where he was immediately informed that he was not under arrest. At the close of a 1/2-hour interview, respondent did in fact leave the police station without hindrance. It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in custody “or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a “coercive environment.” Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda, by its terms, was made applicable, and to which it is limited.
The officer’s false statement about having discovered Mathiason’s fingerprints at the scene was found by the Supreme Court of Oregon to be another circumstance contributing to the coercive environment which makes the Miranda rationale applicable. Whatever relevance this fact may have to other issues in the case, it has nothing to do with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule.
… [T]he judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
The respondent in this case was interrogated behind closed doors at police headquarters in connection with a burglary investigation. He had been named by the victim of the burglary as a suspect, and was told by the police that they believed he was involved. He was falsely informed that his fingerprints had been found at the scene, and in effect was advised that, by cooperating with the police, he could help himself. Not until after he had confessed was he given the warnings set forth in Miranda v. Arizona (1966).
The Court today holds that, for constitutional purposes, all this is irrelevant because respondent had not “been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’” [Per Curiam opinion] I do not believe that such a determination is possible on the record before us. It is true that respondent was not formally placed under arrest, but surely formalities alone cannot control. At the very least, if respondent entertained an objectively reasonable belief that he was not free to leave during the questioning, then he was “deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way
Plainly the respondent could have so believed, after being told by the police that they thought he was involved in a burglary and that his fingerprints had been found at the scene. Yet the majority is content to note that “there is no indication that … respondent’s freedom to depart was restricted in any way,” [Per Curiam opinion], as if a silent record (and no state court findings) means that the State has sustained its burden … of demonstrating that respondent received his constitutional due.
More fundamentally, however, I cannot agree with the Court’s conclusion that, if respondent were not in custody, no warnings were required. I recognize that Miranda is limited to custodial interrogations. … The rationale of Miranda, however, is not so easily cabined. Miranda requires warnings to “combat” a situation in which there are “inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”
It is, of course, true, as the Court notes, that “[a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it.” [Per Curiam opinion]. But it does not follow that, because police “are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question,” ibid., that they need not administer warnings to anyone unless the factual setting of the Miranda cases is replicated. …
In my view, even if respondent were not in custody, the coercive elements in the instant case were so pervasive as to require Miranda-type warnings. Respondent was interrogated in “privacy” and in “unfamiliar surroundings,” factors on which Miranda places great stress. The investigation had focused on respondent. And respondent was subjected to some of the “deceptive stratagems,” Miranda v. Arizona which called forth the Miranda decision. I therefore agree with the Oregon Supreme Court that to excuse the absence of warnings given these fact is “contrary to the rationale expressed in Miranda.”
. … Today’s decision means, however, that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not provide full protection against mischiefs equivalent to, but different from, custodial interrogation. It is therefore important to note that the state courts remain free, in interpreting state constitutions, to guard against the evil clearly identified by this case.
I respectfully dissent.
Salinas v. Texas (2013)
570 U.S. 178 (2013)
Vote: 5-4
Decision: Affirmed
Plurality: Alito, joined by Kennedy and Roberts
Concurrence: Thomas, joined by Scalia
Dissent: Breyer, joined by Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan
Mr. Justice Alito announced the judgment of the Court …
Without being placed in custody or receiving Miranda warnings, petitioner voluntarily answered the questions of a police officer who was investigating a murder. But petitioner balked when the officer asked whether a ballistics test would show that the shell casings found at the crime scene would match petitioner’s shotgun. Petitioner was subsequently charged with murder, and at trial prosecutors argued that his reaction to the officer’s question suggested that he was guilty. Petitioner claims that this argument violated the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees that “no person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim fails because he did not expressly invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to the officer’s question. It has long been settled that the privilege “generally is not self-executing” and that a witness who desires its protection “must claim it.” Minnesota v. Murphy (1984). … Because petitioner was required to assert the privilege in order to benefit from it, the judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejecting petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim is affirmed.
On the morning of December 18, 1992, two brothers were shot and killed in their Houston home. There were no witnesses to the murders, but a neighbor who heard gunshots saw someone run out of the house and speed away in a dark-colored car. Police recovered six shotgun shell casings at the scene. The investigation led police to petitioner, who had been a guest at a party the victims hosted the night before they were killed. Police visited petitioner at his home, where they saw a dark blue car in the driveway. He agreed to hand over his shotgun for ballistics testing and to accompany police to the station for questioning.
Petitioner’s interview with the police lasted approximately one hour. All agree that the interview was noncustodial, and the parties litigated this case on the assumption that he was not read Miranda warnings. … For most of the interview, petitioner answered the officer’s questions. But when asked whether his shotgun “would match the shells recovered at the scene of the murder,” … petitioner declined to answer. Instead, petitioner “looked down at the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his bottom lip, clenched his hands in his lap, and began to tighten up.”. … After a few moments of silence, the officer asked additional questions, which petitioner answered. …
Following the interview, police arrested petitioner on outstanding traffic warrants. Prosecutors soon concluded that there was insufficient evidence to charge him with the murders, and he was released. A few days later, police obtained a statement from a man who said he had heard petitioner confess to the killings. On the strength of that additional evidence, prosecutors decided to charge petitioner. … In 2007, police discovered petitioner living in the Houston area under an assumed name.
Petitioner did not testify at trial. Over his objection, prosecutors used his reaction to the officer’s question during the 1993 interview as evidence of his guilt. The jury found petitioner guilty, and he received a 20-year sentence. On direct appeal to the Court of Appeals of Texas, petitioner argued that prosecutors’ use of his silence as part of their case in chief violated the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, reasoning that petitioner’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence was not “compelled” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. … The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals took up this case and affirmed on the same ground. …
We granted certiorari … to resolve a division of authority in the lower courts over whether the prosecution may use a defendant’s assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination during a noncustodial police interview as part of its case in chief. … But because petitioner did not invoke the privilege during his interview, we find it unnecessary to reach that question.
The privilege against self-incrimination “is an exception to the general principle that the Government has the right to everyone’s testimony.” Garner v. United States, (1976). To prevent the privilege from shielding information not properly within its scope, we have long held that a witness who “desires the protection of the privilege … must claim it” at the time he relies on it. …
That requirement ensures that the Government is put on notice when a witness intends to rely on the privilege so that it may either argue that the testimony sought could not be self-incriminating, see Hoffman v. United States, (1951), or cure any potential self-incrimination through a grant of immunity, see Kastigar v. United States, (1972). The express invocation requirement also gives courts tasked with evaluating a Fifth Amendment claim a contemporaneous record establishing the witness’ reasons for refusing to answer. …
We have previously recognized two exceptions to the requirement that witnesses invoke the privilege, but neither applies here. First, we held in Griffin v. California, (1965), that a criminal defendant need not take the stand and assert the privilege at his own trial. That exception reflects the fact that a criminal defendant has an “absolute right not to testify.” Turner v. United States, (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). … Since a defendant’s reasons for remaining silent at trial are irrelevant to his constitutional right to do so, requiring that he expressly invoke the privilege would serve no purpose; neither a showing that his testimony would not be self-incriminating nor a grant of immunity could force him to speak. Because petitioner had no comparable unqualified right during his interview with police, his silence falls outside the Griffin exception.
Second, we have held that a witness’ failure to invoke the privilege must be excused where governmental coercion makes his forfeiture of the privilege involuntary. Thus, in Miranda, we said that a suspect who is subjected to the “inherently compelling pressures” of an unwarned custodial interrogation need not invoke the privilege. … Due to the uniquely coercive nature of custodial interrogation, a suspect in custody cannot be said to have voluntarily forgone the privilege “unless he fails to claim it after being suitably warned.” Murphy, supra [(1964)]. …
… [W]here assertion of the privilege would itself tend to incriminate, we have allowed witnesses to exercise the privilege through silence … Leary v. United States (1969). … The principle that unites all of those cases is that a witness need not expressly invoke the privilege where some form of official compulsion denies him “a ‘free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.’ ”. …
Petitioner cannot benefit from that principle because it is undisputed that his interview with police was voluntary. As petitioner himself acknowledges, he agreed to accompany the officers to the station and “was free to leave at any time during the interview.”. … That places petitioner’s situation outside the scope of Miranda and other cases in which we have held that various forms of governmental coercion prevented defendants from voluntarily invoking the privilege. … The critical question is whether, under the “circumstances” of this case, petitioner was deprived of the ability to voluntarily invoke the Fifth Amendment. He was not. We have before us no allegation that petitioner’s failure to assert the privilege was involuntary, and it would have been a simple matter for him to say that he was not answering the officer’s question on Fifth Amendment grounds. Because he failed to do so, the prosecution’s use of his noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioner urges us to adopt a third exception to the invocation requirement for cases in which a witness stands mute and thereby declines to give an answer that officials suspect would be incriminating. Our cases all but foreclose such an exception, which would needlessly burden the Government’s interests in obtaining testimony and prosecuting criminal activity. We therefore decline petitioner’s invitation to craft a new exception to the “general rule” that a witness must assert the privilege to subsequently benefit from it. …
Our cases establish that a defendant normally does not invoke the privilege by remaining silent. In Roberts v. United States [(1984)] … for example, we rejected the Fifth Amendment claim of a defendant who remained silent throughout a police investigation and received a harsher sentence for his failure to cooperate. In so ruling, we explained that “if believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged, he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court could have determined whether his claim was legitimate.” . …
We have also repeatedly held that the express invocation requirement applies even when an official has reason to suspect that the answer to his question would incriminate the witness. Thus, in Murphy we held that the defendant’s self-incriminating answers to his probation officer were properly admitted at trial because he failed to invoke the privilege. …
… [P]etitioner would have us hold that although neither a witness’ silence nor official suspicions are enough to excuse the express invocation requirement, the invocation requirement does not apply where a witness is silent in the face of official suspicions. For the same reasons that neither of those factors is sufficient by itself to relieve a witness of the obligation to expressly invoke the privilege, we conclude that they do not do so together. A contrary result would do little to protect those genuinely relying on the Fifth Amendment privilege while placing a needless new burden on society’s interest in the admission of evidence that is probative of a criminal defendant’s guilt.
. …
In any event, it is settled that forfeiture of the privilege against self-incrimination need not be knowing … Statements against interest are regularly admitted into evidence at criminal trials … and there is no good reason to approach a defendant’s silence any differently.
. …
We also reject petitioner’s argument that an express invocation requirement will encourage police officers to “ ‘unfairly “trick” ’ ” suspects into cooperating. … Petitioner worries that officers could unduly pressure suspects into talking by telling them that their silence could be used in a future prosecution. But as petitioner himself concedes, police officers “have done nothing wrong” when they “accurately state the law.”. … So long as police do not deprive a witness of the ability to voluntarily invoke the privilege, there is no Fifth Amendment violation.
Before petitioner could rely on the privilege against self-incrimination, he was required to invoke it. Because he failed to do so, the judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
In my view the Fifth Amendment here prohibits the prosecution from commenting on the petitioner’s silence in response to police questioning. And I dissent from the Court’s contrary conclusion.
. … The plurality believes that the Amendment does not bar the evidence and comments because Salinas “did not expressly invoke the privilege against self-incrimination” when he fell silent during the questioning at the police station. … But, in my view, that conclusion is inconsistent with this Court’s case law and its underlying practical rationale.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits prosecutors from commenting on an individual’s silence where that silence amounts to an effort to avoid becoming “a witness against himself.” This Court has specified that “a rule of evidence” permitting “comment … by counsel” in a criminal case upon a defendant’s failure to testify “violates the Fifth Amendment.” Griffin v. California, (1965). … And, since “it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation,” the “prosecution may not … use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.” Miranda v. Arizona, (1966). …
Particularly in the context of police interrogation, a contrary rule would undermine the basic protection that the Fifth Amendment provides. … To permit a prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s constitutionally protected silence would put that defendant in an impossible predicament. He must either answer the question or remain silent. If he answers the question, he may well reveal, for example, prejudicial facts, disreputable associates, or suspicious circumstances even if he is innocent. … If he remains silent, the prosecutor may well use that silence to suggest a consciousness of guilt. And if the defendant then takes the witness stand in order to explain either his speech or his silence, the prosecution may introduce, say for impeachment purposes, a prior conviction that the law would otherwise make inadmissible. Thus, where the Fifth Amendment is at issue, to allow comment on silence directly or indirectly can compel an individual to act as “a witness against himself” very much what the Fifth Amendment forbids. … And that is similarly so whether the questioned individual, as part of his decision to remain silent, invokes the Fifth Amendment explicitly or implicitly, through words, through deeds, or through reference to surrounding circumstances.
It is consequently not surprising that this Court, more than half a century ago, explained that “no ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the privilege.” Quinn v. United States, (1955). Thus, a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify at trial even if neither the defendant nor anyone else ever mentions a Fifth Amendment right not to do so. Circumstances, not a defendant’s statement, tie the defendant’s silence to the right. …
The cases in which this Court has insisted that a defendant expressly mention the Fifth Amendment by name in order to rely on its privilege to protect silence are cases where (1) the circumstances surrounding the silence (unlike the present case) did not give rise to an inference that the defendant intended, by his silence, to exercise his Fifth Amendment rights; and (2) the questioner greeted by the silence (again unlike the present case) had a special need to know whether the defendant sought to rely on the protections of the Fifth Amendment. … These cases include Roberts, Rogers, Sullivan, Vajtauer, and Jenkins—all of which at least do involve the protection of silence—and also include cases emphasized by the plurality that are not even about silence—namely, Murphy and Garner.
In Roberts and Rogers, the individual refused to answer questions that government investigators (in Roberts) and a grand jury (in Rogers) asked, principally because the individual wanted to avoid incriminating other persons. … But the Fifth Amendment does not protect someone from incriminating others; it protects against self-incrimination. In turn, neither the nature of the questions nor the circumstances of the refusal to answer them provided any basis to infer a tie between the silence and the Fifth Amendment, while knowledge of any such tie would have proved critical to the questioner’s determination as to whether the defendant had any proper legal basis for claiming Fifth Amendment protection.
. …
Perhaps most illustrative is Jenkins, a case upon which the plurality relies … and upon which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied almost exclusively. … On cross-examination at his trial, Jenkins claimed that his killing was in self-defense after being attacked. … The prosecutor then asked why he did not report the alleged attack, and in closing argument suggested that Jenkins’ failure to do so cast doubt on his claim to have acted in self-defense. … We explained that this unusual form of “prearrest silence” was not constitutionally protected from use at trial. … How would anyone have known that Jenkins, while failing to report an attack, was relying on the Fifth Amendment? And how would the government have had any way of determining whether his claim was valid? In Jenkins, as in Roberts, Rogers, Sullivan, and Vajtauer, no one had any reason to connect silence to the Fifth Amendment; and the government had no opportunity to contest any alleged connection. …
. …
We end where we began. “No ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the privilege.” Quinn. … Much depends on the circumstances of the particular case, the most important circumstances being: (1) whether one can fairly infer that the individual being questioned is invoking the Amendment’s protection; (2) if that is unclear, whether it is particularly important for the questioner to know whether the individual is doing so; and (3) even if it is, whether, in any event, there is a good reason for excusing the individual from referring to the Fifth Amendment, such as inherent penalization simply by answering.
Applying these principles to the present case, I would hold that Salinas need not have expressly invoked the Fifth Amendment. The context was that of a criminal investigation. Police told Salinas that and made clear that he was a suspect. His interrogation took place at the police station. Salinas was not represented by counsel. The relevant question—about whether the shotgun from Salinas’ home would incriminate him—amounted to a switch in subject matter. And it was obvious that the new question sought to ferret out whether Salinas was guilty of murder. … These circumstances give rise to a reasonable inference that Salinas’ silence derived from an exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights. …
I recognize that other cases may arise where facts and circumstances surrounding an individual’s silence present a closer question. The critical question—whether those circumstances give rise to a fair inference that the silence rests on the Fifth Amendment—will not always prove easy to administer. But that consideration does not support the plurality’s rule-based approach here, for the administrative problems accompanying the plurality’s approach are even worse.
. …
Far better, in my view, to pose the relevant question directly: Can one fairly infer from an individual’s silence and surrounding circumstances an exercise of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege? The need for simplicity, the constitutional importance of applying the Fifth Amendment to those who seek its protection, and this Court’s case law all suggest that this is the right question to ask here. And the answer to that question in the circumstances of today’s case is clearly: yes.
For these reasons, I believe that the Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from commenting on Salinas’s silence. I respectfully dissent from the Court’s contrary conclusion.
